The most important single step is to persuade those in the library and archive community who favour a policy of secrecy that this policy is counter-productive, for the following reasons:-

• A thief often works in a predictable way. Immediate circulation of general information about a suspect, his way of working and the type of material involved, could mean that the next library visited was expecting him. For this, there needs to be an efficient, international, security officers' network. It is hoped that those involved in the separate existing networks will find ways to link them together. Alternatively, public announcements could be put out via the map discussion lists, referring to the location in only general terms [e.g. "a library in Germany/California"], to preserve the institution's anonymity
• Assuming (which is usually, but not always, the case) that material is stolen in order to be sold, the thief's next step is to find a dealer or auction-house willing to handle the material. If the relevant information about the stolen items is not circulated immediately to the trade networks, the thief is far less likely to be picked up at this crucial early stage. Within a week, the stolen maps may be thousands of miles away. If the items are discovered, perhaps months later, they may have passed through several hands, making the business of restitution complicated. Who is responsible; who is to bear the loss? On the other hand, a well-informed map trade can play a valuable, quasi-police role
• Unless the law enforcement agency in question knows that material has been stolen, and from where, they will find it very difficult to prove that a theft has occurred. Conversely, since the volumes butchered in the recent cases remain with the library, it is easy to make a visual check of loose maps against their suspected parent - provided the police know which library to contact
• In the same way, the institution is less likely to retrieve their stolen material
• Research libraries are also among the major purchasers of early maps. The secrecy policy increases the risk that they will, inadvertently, buy stolen material themselves
• The thief, and any dealer who may be actively colluding with them, is actually less likely to be caught, because the risk of making the first sale is much reduced if the trade has not been alerted and the identity of the material has not been widely circulated
• Fed with rumours rather than facts (in the case of the recent European thefts), the early map trade was the victim of a widespread suspicion, which it could not counter. The net result has been a deepening of distrust between the libraries and the trade. This helps only the thief

A word, first, about the working of the early map trade. Most such maps are ultimately sold into the area depicted. Hence maps of America, for example, when stolen in Europe, can end up in the hands of unsuspecting American dealers. Maps of the world are particularly popular because, by definition, they can be sold anywhere. The trade in early maps is thus thoroughly international. Any solution must have an equivalent global dimension.

It is proposed here that what is required is a central register of stolen maps. The register's location and precise content have still to be resolved, but the recommended principles would be as follows:-

• All information pointing to the identity of the institution involved would be suppressed (though some trusted individual(s) would have to be able to make the connection and link to the appropriate police force). Such a register could then be organised bibliographically rather than by institution
• Descriptions of the stolen items would need to combine clear bibliographical information with what is really vital: namely the copy-specific details (for example, the height of the paper, rather than the plate size) that distinguish that unique individual from perhaps a dozen other copies that might legitimately be found in the trade and illustrated on their websites. By narrowing attention to examples that had the relevant characteristics, much police time could be saved, and the trade could easily determine that most of the maps in circulation had not been stolen
• All concerned should seek to post such information as speedily as possible
• The register would be on the web (rather than taking the present fragmented form of postings to a variety of Internet discussion lists)
• The register would, preferably, be open to everybody, rather than restricted to members of a particular organisation(s). Knowledge that such a publicly accessible listing existed would also have a significant deterrent effect. This outweighs the understandable concern that thieves might be able to profit in some way from a register. Such a web listing, albeit far from comprehensive because of the limited release of information by institutions, is run by James Hess on the Heritage Map Museum site: 'Reports of map, atlas, and globe thefts from around the world' {not functioning October 2007}. Another is proposed by the nascent International Antiquarian Mapsellers Association (IAMA). A check through the Theft Report sites reveals how little information there is about stolen maps
• Well-publicised, universal access would enable such a register to play an active part in the 'due diligence' process, since dealers and auction houses would be expected to check the register before handling material, and could be considered negligent if they had not done so

The authorities cited under 'Procedures for reporting theft' recommend wide and immediate disclosure - see for example 'Guidelines regarding thefts in libraries', issued by the Association of [American] College and Research Libraries (see particularly Section I, F and Appendix I) and < http://www.mla.gov.uk/webdav/harmonise?Page/@id=73&Document/@id= 19259&Section[@stateId_eq_left_hand_root]/@id=4332&Session/@id=D_QeNyu7brId0ITOVY4ydr > 'Guide on the Action to be taken in Cases of Theft...', issued by the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA) (see 'Recovery of the Property'). It is also worth quoting a London manuscripts dealer, from the Observer (Jason Burke, 'Britain leads illicit trade in rare books', 10 June 2001): "These days we all keep each other informed of what's gone missing and no one will touch anything that looks hot. Most of what is stolen is virtually unsaleable as a result."

However, when it comes to disclosure of information, institutions vary in their approach. Despite official advice, the recent pattern has been in favour of secrecy. The accompanying page of links shows that there is no single organisation that can speak for all the world's research libraries (although there is a single international body for archives). Closer co-ordination between the representative bodies for the UK and Europe as a whole, on the one hand, and the various organisations in the United States, on the other, is essential, both to co-ordinate policy and to share information about stolen items with the map trade.

Tony Campbell
(formerly Map Librarian, British Library and, prior to that, an antiquarian map dealer)
5 May 2002